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*The countries comprising the G-l0 group are:
The United States; United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, France,
Canada, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, and Switzerland,
Many expected the introduction of generalized
floating exchange rates in the early 1970s to
increase the degree to which national economies
would be insulated from foreign disturbances,
particularly foreign monetary disturbances. How-
ever, the subsequent high correlation among
output fluctuations in different countries has
called this assumption into question. At the same
time, it is commonplace to note that the nature of
the shocks the world economy faced in the 1970s
and 1980s departed from those faced in the
1950s and 1960s. This change in the nature of
the underlying disturbances may have played a
more important role than any apparent short-
comings in the flexible exchange regime.
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To examine this possibility, this Letter focuses on
japan's experience under flexible exchange rates.
Among the major industrial economies, japan
offers the greatest prima facie evidence that the
shift in exchange rate regimes provided greater
insulation from foreign shocks because its econ-
omy became less volatile after exchange rates
began to float. However, the simple observation
that the japanese economy became less volatile
does not by itself prove that floating rates were
the causal factor. What remains unresolved is
whether the move to flexible rates or a change in
the nature of domestic and foreign disturbances
was primarily responsible for dampened output
fluctuations in japan.
Under fixed exchange rates, japan had the
largestHuetuati0fls-in0utputitm0f1g-the-majer-
industrial countries, while under flexible rates,
japan has had the smallest, as the chart shows.
Some have argued that the switch to floating
rates permitted japan to pursue more stable
monetary policy, which, in turn, increased out-
put stability. Proponents of this view point to the
fact that the variability in japanese money growth
declined markedly beginning in the mid-1970s,
and that this decline coincided with the reduc-
tion in japanese output volatility.
Adifferent view
An alternative explanation is that diminished
nonmonetary domestic economic disturbances
primarily may account for more stable output
growth in japan. According to this view, real
output and monetary disturbances in japan dur-
ing the fixed-rate period were predominantly of
domestic origin, associated with japan's so-called
"high growth period:' During this period, the
japanese economy experienced double-digit real
growth rates, fundamental, sectoral demand and
supply shifts, and rapid technological innovation.
The abrupt end of this high growth period in the
early 1970s (for reasons unrelated to the change
in exchange rate regimes), therefore, may ac-
count for the subsequent increase in output
stability.
During the first three decades of the post-war
period, japan was a semi-industrialized country
in the process of catching up with the more ad-
vanced countries of Europe and North America.
For most of this period labor was an abundant
resource, but there were shortages of capital
equipment, raw materials, and technical exper-
tise. Postwar economic policy was therefore
designed strategically to give priority to plant
and equipment investment and to the exportFRBSF
sector as a means of securing imported raw
materials. Elements of this policy included tight
trade and exchange rate management, protection
of industry, tax treatment favoring saving and in-
vestment, and credit subsidies to priority sectors.
exchange rate period is correct hinges crucially
on whether the nature of the underlying disturb-
ances has changed or whether the exchange rate
system has affected the manner in which Japan
has adjusted to these disturbances.
Our results indicate that under fixed exchange
rates, domestic shocks contributed much more
significantly to the volatility of Japanese real
GNP than did foreign shocks. Specifically, under
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shocks accounted for between 89 percent (at
the one-quarter horizon) and 68 percent (at the
30-quarter forecast horizon) of the variance in
Japanese real GNP. In contrast, the proportion
of Japanese real GNP variation associated with
foreign shocks ranged from only 11 percent in
the short term to 32 percent in the longer term.
To shed light on this issue, we measured the
extent to which Japanese economic disturb-
ances during both the fixed and the flexible rate
periods could be attributed to domestic versus
foreign sources. In our analysis, movements in
Japanese real GNP that are not attributable to
movements in U.S. real GNP and/or changes
in the nominal U.S. money supply (Ml) or to
changes in the real world price of oil are inter-
preted as arising from domestic Uapanese)
disturbances.
The financial system and monetary policy played
a fairly passive role during this period. The finan-
cial system was highly concentrated and exten-
sively regulated to ensure that resources flowed
to priority sectors. Similarly, the stance of mone-
tary policy during the period was generally
expansionary; its fundamental purpose was to
support the rapid growth of the economy and
to provide high priority sectors with subsidized
credit.
The rapid growth in the investment and export
sectors of the Japanese economy and the conse-
quent double-digit growth rates in overall output
during this period are well documented. Sectoral
output and resource shifts (particularly, the ab-
sorption of latent unemployment in agriculture
and low-productivity traditional services into
the rapidly growing investment and export sec-
tors) characterized the Japanese economy during
the "high-growth" period. Economists Denison
and Chung, for example, found that five factors
contributed to faster growth in Japan than in
other industrial countries: increased labor inputs,
increased capital stock, advances in knowledge,
reallocation of resources away from agriculture,
and economies of scale.
An empirical question
Which of the two competing interpretations of
Japan's reduced output variability in the floating
In the flexible rate period, domestic shocks
were of secondary importance. Instead, foreign
shocks accounted for 77 percent of Japanese
The "low growth" period in Japan is usually GNP variation in the short term and 65 percent
identified as beginning in the early 1970s. By in the longer run. Thus, it appears that shocks of
this time, Japan largely had "caught up" with foreign origin played a much smaller role in gen-
the West, and the greater part of the sectoral erating Japanese output instability during the
transformation of the Japanese economy had period of fixed exchange rates than during the
been completed. The sectoral reallocation of re- period of flexible rates.
sources stabilized, sectoral shifts dampened in
.magnitude andfrequency, and average economic ---Ourresults.-are-consistenLw.itb the-h-ypotbesis
growth dropped to half its previous rate. Average that major sectoral shifts and the rapid industrial
trend real GNP growth in Japan was 9.4 percent transformation of the Japanese economy during
a year during the high growth period and 4.2 the greater part of the fixed exchange rate period
percent during the low growth period. These were primarily responsible for the large observed
developments may be the primary reason for the output fluctuations, and that foreign factors
reduction in the variability of output during this played a secondary role. These results seem to
period, playing a much larger role than the contradict the standard view that the shift in the
change in the exchange rate regime. exchange rate regime has been the main reason
Japan has enjoyed greater economic stability in
the latter period. Otherwise, the switch to flex-
ible exchange rates should have insulated Japan
from these foreign shocks. In fact, our resultseconomy from foreign shocks. This effect, how-
ever, was swamped by the reduction in the role
played by domestically originating disturbances.
In the case ofJapan, it appears that the changing
nature of the fundamental disturbances to the
economy, rather than the switch in exchange rate
regime, is primarily responsible for the remark-
able stability in real output growth since the
mid-1970s.
Our results also cast doubt on the standard ar-
gument that Japan's output stability resulted from
the monetary stabi!ity ach ieved under floating
rates. Under fixed exchange rates, Japan's mone-
tary instability was not an independent source of
economic fluctuations; the money supply simply
responded to domestic and foreign disturbances
in order to maintain the exchange rate. Conse-
quently, greater monetary stability after the shift
to floating rates cannot, by itself, account for the
reduced importance of domestic Japanese
disturbances.
Shocks, not regimes
We have focused on Japan in part because,
on the surface, it appears to fit the traditional
theory regarding the superior insulating proper-
ties of flexible exchange rates: since the move
to flexible exchange rates in February 1973 Japa-
nese output variance has fallen markedly. Our
research suggests, however, that a more plausible
alternative explanation is simply that domestic
disturbances were more frequent and their mag-
nitude much greater during the period ofJapan's













Not surprisingly, the variance of real oil shocks
in the pre-1973 period of fixed rates was esti-
mated to have been less than half of that during
the flexible rate regime. The variance of u.s.
monetary shocks also was significantly smaller
in the pre-1973 period, although real u.s. GNP
shocks were somewhat larger in the fixed rate
period. Nonetheless, by far the largest change
occurred in the variance of domestic Japanese
shocks. During the period prior to 1973, the vari-
ance of such disturbances was three times its
value in the period after the shift to flexible rates.
indicate that foreign shocks have been more
important under flexible exchange rates.
Changing disturbances
Nonetheless, one cannot conclude on this basis
that the flexible exchange rate regime provided
no insulation (or worse, that it may have inten-
sified the impact of foreign shocks on the Japa-
nese economy). Rather, foreign shocks may have
dominated domestic shocks during the flexible
rate period simply because the nature and pat-
tern of the shocks facing the economy changed.
Perhaps more importantly, the move to floating
rates also may have freed monetary policy to en-
gage in policies designed to offset the impact of
domestic disturbances. To examine these pos-
sibilities, we calculated the estimated variances
of the disturbances under the two exchange rate
regimes.
These results indicate that the nature and mag-
nitude of the underlying disturbances facing the
Japanese economy under the two exchange rate
regimes were quite different. They also suggest
that although foreign shocks account for relatively
more of the forecast error variance ofJapanese
real output under flexible exchange rates, this
probably is attributable to the greatly reduced
magnitude of underlying domestic disturbances,
and not to the switch to flexible exchange rates
per se. In fact, we find some evidence that flex-
ible rates did help to insulate the domestic
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